I. Heartland vs. Rimland
In the study of International Relations, no one interpreted more basically than late Prof. N. J. Spykman who analyzed World Politics in terms of geo-politics. As Sterling Professor in Yale University, he advocated American security on a global basis and suggested appropriate lines of foreign policy. In review of the past American diplomatic activities, however, we must point out that policies at variance with Prof. Spykman's arguments have invariably ended in mistakes or even blunders.
He objected to Sir Halford Mackinder's dictum: "Who controls eastern Europe rules the Heartland; who rules the Heartland rules the World Island; and who rules the World Island rules the World." (1) Because "the actual facts of the Russian economy and geography make it not at all clear that the heartland is or will be in the very near future a world center of communication, mobility, and power potential." And "within the immediate future, Central Asia will undoubtedly remain a region with a fairly low power potential." (2) With the addition of topographic condition and separatist sentiments among Moslems, Central Asia is the weakest spot of Stalinist Communisdom. Therefore, Prof. Spykman suggested a slogan for the power politics of the old World, which must be "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." (3) "The rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate region, situated as it is between the heartland and the marginal sea. It function as a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power." "The war that the United Nations are fighting and winning today is, in its physical aspects, a war for control of the rimland littoral of Europe and Asia. Our objective is to prevent the domination of both these regions by hegemonic powers whose principles and ideals are opposed to the whole course of Western civilization." (4) So, it is the rimland of the World Island that determines the policy of U. S. A. Accordingly, this policy had been well expressed in Hay's announcements of Feb. 1, 1902 and Jan. 13, 1905, in Bryan's note of Mar. 13, 1915, and subsequently in Stimson's non-recognition of Jan. 7, 1932. More announcement or notification would not be enough to serve the purpose of safe guarding American interests. "She must find some way of exerting her power in these regions during peace time so that she will not have to allow a situation to develop which will force her into a third world war." (5) The only effective course of action would be an alignment with an independent and powerful China. Failing to do this, the Americans would surely bring disasters on their own heads. In Prof. Spykman's opinion, the present war in Korea is inevitable, as "States are willing to use their military power not only for the protection of their own territory but also for the protection of the territory of others, not for any altruistic reasons but because the continued existence of the third state contributes to their own security." (6)
II. But Regrettably, Spykman's observations Were not Consulted When the Yalta Agreement Was Signed.
The bitter police action in Korea might have been averted, had Americans in Yalta Conference determined not to sacrifice Chinese interests in Manchuria. Ever since Peter the Great, Russians have repeatedly attempted to break through the encircling ring of border states and reach the ocean. So Prof. Spykman predicted before 1944 that "the pressure of Russia outward toward the rimland will constitute one important aspect of the post-war settlement." (7) The Yalta arrangement of restoring to Russia 1904 rights and privileges in Manchuria and signing off China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia would not buy Russia's scrupulous observance of treaty obligations; her insatiate desire can be realized by using her puppet tools of Chinese Communists. Soviet Russians have manipulated such profound influence upon Chinese politics; it is naive to expect Titoists from among those who serve foreign interests rather than their own.
The Yalta Agreement could neither delimit the Soviet advancement nor meet the interests of China. (8) In fact, the Chinese did not welcome it. Generalissimo Chiang was deeply hurt by the information. (9) Dr. T. V. Soong declined to sign it for it was understood not to be an honorable treaty. Dr. Soong tried hard during the negotiation to secure Soviet recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia, which was recognized by the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924. "Dr. Soong was apparently willing to agree to other significant important concession in return for Outer Mongolia." (10) Even Dr. S. C. Wang, who signed the Treaty, did leave an excuse for future reputation, that is "China agreed to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if a plebiscite after the defeat of Japan confirmed that that was the desire of the Outer Mongolian people." (11) Why should those negotiators be so eager to save China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia? It is simply because Outer Mongolia and Tunna Tuva are so vital to China's security. Owning to its central position, Mongolia might serve as a base for both advancing southward to central China and attacking flankwise toward Manchuria or Sinkiang; Prof. Spykman thus undoubtedly observed, "the post-war period will witness a continuation of the struggle of Russia and China for control and influence over Sinkiang Province and Outer Mongolia." (12) American must see to the restoration of Outer Mongolia to China in future, if she really intends to balance the power in the Far East, because from the border of Outer Mongolia it is not more than 100 miles to Irkutsk. Together with Manchuria and Korea, they constitute such an important sector of Asiatic rimland as the permanent peace will be rested upon it.
(1) The Geography of the Peace P. 43
(2) op. cit. P. 42
(3) op. cit. P. 43
(4) op. cit. P. 45
(5) op. cit. P. 55
(6) American Strategy in World Politics P. 19
(7) The Geography of the Peace P. 53
(8) See "Statements made in Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East of Eighty-second Congress" Part III P. 1846 and 1881
(9) op. cit. P. 2417
(10) see White Paper P. 117 footnote
(11) op. cit. P. 117
(12) The Geography of the Peace P. 51